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TEXTS OF STATUTES : .V CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Rule 103'a)and(d" " W "-/.es of Evidence 
Rule > ' ^"l1" ^ J7( "^ evidc-
la . . n. ^ tuLuneous ruling. Error may not be 
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes 
dence u:.1- * substantial right of the party is 
(1)Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting 
evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike 
appears of record, stating the specific ground of 
objection, if" the specific ground was not apparent 
from the context; or 
(d)Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking 
notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights 
although they were not brought to the attention of the 
court. 
Rule 609(a) Utah Pulos ul Evidence. 
Rule LI!1...1" , Impeachment by evidence of conviction of 
crime. 
(a)General rule For the purpose of attacking t1— 
credibility of a wi tness, evidence that he has been 
convicted of a cri rue shall be admitted if elicited from 
him or established by public record during cross-
examination but only if the crime (l)was punishable by 
death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the 
law under which he was convicted, and the court 
determines that the probative value of admitting lit lis 
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the 
defendant, or (2)involved dishonesty or false 
statement, regardless of the punishment: 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether defendant waived his right to appeal for 
failure to make a contemporaneous objection. 
2. Whether the court erred in admitting evidence of a 
prior conviction under Rule 609, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
3. Whether the error was harmless, if the Court were to 
find error. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALT LAKE CITY, A 
Municipal Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
GLENN E. HOLTMAN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
CASE NO. 900177-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment rendered by the Honorable 
Paul G. Grant, Third Circuit Court, in and for Salt Lake City, 
State of Utah. A jury found Mr. Holtman guilty of Retail Theft, 
a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Salt Lake City Ordinances, 
§11.36.060 after a trial held on January 24, 1990. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 28, 1989, the defendant and his brother went 
into the Nordstromfs department store at the Crossroads Mall in 
downtown Salt Lake City. At the time he entered the store, 
defendant had in his possession a pair of pink and black 
sunglasses. (T.29) Ms. Susan Bradley, a Nordstromfs security 
agent, observed defendant enter Nordstromfs and head directly to 
the sunglasses display case. He spoke to a sales clerk and 
several pairs of glasses were removed from the case for his 
inspection. (T.3,29) 
Ms* Bradley continued to observe defendant for 
approximately ten minutes bcscause she felt that his mannerisms 
were suspicious. He paid an inordinate amount of attention to 
the other people in the department, observingr what they were 
doing, and looking at the salespeople who were quite busy. (T.4) 
Ms. Bradley also testified that defendant spent a considerable 
amount of time "switching" the glasses back and forth. She 
described the defendant as laying his glasses next to the store's 
glasses, trying on a pair, then hooking them to his clothes, 
looking around and then switching them back and repeating the 
process with his own or another pair of glasses. (T.5) 
At this same time, unbeknownst to Ms. Bradley, Mr. 
Scott Alsop, also a Nordstrom's security agent, was watching the 
defendant. Mr. Alsop also testified that defendant seemed very 
nervous and spent a lot of time looking around while at the 
display case trying on glasses. (T.12-15) He observed the 
defendant for seven to ten minutes. (T.16) 
At this point, Ms. Bradley became aware of Mr. Alsop 
and another unidentified agent and told them she was going to 
back off a little from defendant since her closeness might be 
making him nervous. While talking to the other agents, Ms. 
Bradley continued to watch defendant. He picked up the store's 
glasses and hooked them on his coat, put his old pair in the box, 
turned the box upside down so the contents could not readily be 
seen, and left the department. (T.4,6,7) 
Ms. Bradley went to the counter and picked up the box 
defendant had set down and found a pair of badly beat-up, 
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scratched glasses. (T.7) She notified Mr. Alsop that a switch 
had been made and Mr. Alsop, along with the other agent, followed 
defendant to the third floor and stopped him as he left 
Nordstroms. (T. 15,16) 
Defendant claimed, both at the time of the arrest and 
at trial, that he had mistakenly walked out with what he believed 
were his glasses. (T. 8,32) Although the defendant's glasses 
were a different brand than Nordstrom's, both pair were hot pink 
and black and similar in appearance except for their condition. 
Prior to defendant's testifying, defense counsel moved 
to exclude evidence of defendant's prior felony conviction for 
Grand Larceny. Argument was heard on the motion outside of the 
jury's presence. Defense counsel proffered as the facts of the 
felony conviction that defendant acted as the middleman for a 
friend who was stealing cars and who knew a "fence" for the cars. 
Defendant did not know the "fence" and merely carried the keys 
from his friend to the "fence". (T. 21,22) 
The court stated in its ruling that any admission of a 
prior felony conviction would have a potentially damaging effect 
but that the probative value in this case outweighed the 
prejudicial effect. The court stated that since intent was the 
only issue and since intent can only be judged by an individual's 
actions, the prior conviction was relevant to the issue of 
credibility where defendant had claimed mistake as his defense to 
both theft charges. The court ruled that the prosecution was 
entitled to address the witness' veracity and the prior 
conviction had sufficient probative value to be brought up for 
impeachment purposes. (T. 23,24) 
Defense counsel made no objection to the court's 
ruling. At the conclusion of his direct examination of 
defendant, defense counsel elicited the following testimony: 
Q. Have you ever had a prior felony conviction? 
A* Yes, I have in Virginia about July 6th of last 
year. 
Q. What was the crime? 
A. Grand Larceny. (T.32) (Inaudible response-
reconstructed by stipulation of the parties). 
This was the only reference to defcmdant's conviction. 
The prosecution did not refer to the prior conviction during 
cross-examination and neither party referred to it in closing 
argument. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The defendant's failure to make a contemporaneous, 
specific objection to the court's ruling precludes appellate 
review. Moreover, defense counsel chose to raise the issue as 
part of his direct examination rather than risk the prosecution 
raising the issue as impeachment. This was a legitimate trial 
strategy that should not be second-guessed by the Court. 
The trial court did not err in ruling that the prior 
conviction would be allowed as impeachment. The judge 
specifically found that the* information was probative on the 
issue of credibility. In addition, the defendant's participation 
in the auto-theft scheme involves dishonesty. Even if this court 
were to determine that the lower court erred, the error was 
harmless. 
- 4 -
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDANT WAIVED THE ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1) and (d) and case law require 
that counsel make specific objection to any error in the 
admission of evidence or that the error be plain before an 
appellate court will review the claim on appeal. Absent plain 
error, there must be a contemporaneous objection to justify 
appellate review. State v. Ross, 782 P.2d 529, 532 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989); State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12,15 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Defense counsel failed to object on the record to the 
trial court's ruling thereby waiving the issue on appeal. Absent 
an objection, the Court must then consider whether the trial 
court erred in admitting the prior conviction and whether such 
error constituted plain error. Even assuming this Court were to 
find error, it would not constitute plain error such that it 
should have been obvious to the trial court. Ross, 782 P.2d 532^ 
Although Judge Grant did not clearly state that Grand Larceny is 
a crime involving dishonesty, his statement that if the facts 
were different his ruling might be different and that he believed 
the prosecution to be addressing the witness' veracity indicates 
the court believed that defendant's prior conviction involved a 
crime of dishonesty and was, therefore, admissible as to 
credibility. 
We're dealing in both these cases with 
what the intent was within the mind of 
the individual which really can only 
be judged by outward activities and 
tendencies a very difficult decision. 
Difficult I think, sufficiently so, 
that the information of prior 
conviction and the facts pertaining 
thereto would be very important in 
[the] determination of this jury as 
to the believability of the witness. 
So I think it is in point in this case 
if it were, well if the facts of this 
case were different, then I may be, it 
may be a different aspect, but that's 
the observations of the court and I 
think under those circumstances the 
prosecution is addressing the issue of 
the veracity of the witness and they 
appear fairly similar. So, I think my 
position would be that it is of 
sufficient probative value for the very 
important issue before the court as the 
past conviction may be brought up as 
impeachment. (T.24) (Portions 
inaudible - agreed to by stipulation.) 
Not only did defense counsel not object to the 
admission of the prior conviction, he elicited the information 
from defendant as part of the direct examination. It was never 
referred to at any other point in the trial. This was a 
legitimate trial strategy of the defense and the defendant should 
not be allowed to predicate a claim of error upon its own 
evidence. 
POINT II: 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR 
IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF A PRIOR 
FELONY CONVICTION UNDER RULE 609 
Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(2) specifically allows evidence of 
a prior conviction involving dishonesty or false statement to be 
automatically admitted for purposes of impeachment. This does 
not, however, answer the question whether theft crimes are crimes 
involving dishonesty. This Court has previously held that the 
trial court may inquire to determine if honesty was a factor in 
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the prior conviction and, if so, the prior conviction is 
admissible under Utah R. Evid. 609 (a)(2). 765 P.2d 18. If the 
crime does not involve dishonesty or false statement, the trial 
court then considers admissibility under 609(a)(1), determining 
whether it was punishable by imprisonment for more than 1 year, 
then weighing probativeness against prejudice to determine 
admissibility. Id. 
Larceny is defined in Virginia as "the wrongful or 
fraudulent taking of personal goods of some extrinsic value, 
belonging to another without his assent, and with the intention 
to deprive the owner thereof permanently". Berryman v. Moore, 
619 F. Supp. 853 (E.D. Va. 1985). The Virginia court has also 
held that one who knows that property is stolen and assists in 
its disposition or transportation is guilty of larceny. Moehring 
v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 564, 290 S.E.2d 891 (1982). Defendant 
was convicted of grand larceny for acting as the middleman 
between his friend who stole the cars and the individual(s) who 
were to dispose of the cars. Defendant's participation in the 
scheme involves fraud or dishonesty, not by participation in the 
original theft, but in acting as if he had a legitimate right to 
dispose of property which he knew to be stolen. Even if 
defendant's particular action in disposing of the vehicles to a 
fence did not involve dishonesty (in that the fence probably knew 
the cars were stolen), the entire scheme involved deception in 
the ultimate disposition of the cars. Therefore, it would be 
reasonable to determine that defendant's conviction involved 
false statement or dishonesty. 
Defendant's prior conviction was also admissible under 
Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(1). Grand larceny is punishable in Virginia 
by confinement of not less than one year nor more than twenty 
years. VA. CODE ANN. §18.2-95 (1950, as amended). The trial 
court specifically found that the prior conviction was more 
probative than prejudicial and it could be used as impeachment 
(T.24). Although the trial court did not specifically enumerate 
each of the factors listed in State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 
1334 (Utah 1986), it is clear that the court weighed the 
appropriate issues before making his ruling. 
POINT III: 
ASSUMING THE COURT ERRED IN 
ADMITTING THE PRIOR CONVICTION, 
SUCH ERROR WAS HARMLESS. 
Error is reversible only if there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more* favorable result absent the error. Wight, 
765 P.2d 19. Defendant has failed to establish any likelihood of 
an acquittal absent evidence of the prior conviction. Two 
security guards testified that they observed defendant for 
approximately ten minutes. During that time, both formed the 
opinion that defendant was behaving suspiciously and that he was 
going to shoplift the sunglasses. Defendant spent a significant 
amount of his time looking at the other shoppers and clerks while 
supposedly shopping for sunglasses. He also spent considerable 
time "switching" the glasses, alternately trying on the pair he 
entered the store with and the Nordstromfs glasses. After 
returning a pair of glasses to the box, defendant placed the box 
so the clerk would not be able to see into it and left the 
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department. One of the security guards took immediate possession 
of the box in which was found a pair of obviously used and worn 
sunglasses. 
Defendant denied that he behaved suspiciously and 
claimed that he inadvertently walked out with Nordstrom's 
glasses. The jury was entitled to reject his testimony as 
incredible and self-serving. One passing reference to a prior 
felony conviction, elicited by defense counsel, likely had little 
bearing on the ultimate outcome given the eyewitness testimony of 
the two prosecution witnesses. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, appellee requests this Court 
to affirm the conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this )5^ day of October, 1990. 
JANICE L. FROST 
Attorney for Appellee 
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